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Abstract
Redistributing incomes has always been one of the main goals of Iranian policy
makers, although political regimes have changed frequently between 1991 and 2004.
We have applied a microsimulation using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and a
Heckman correction for sample selection bias to compare simulation results for a
hypothetical unchanged situation with the actual policy shift observed. While we
are able to identify the years in which policy shifts occurred, our results suggest that
the intended redistribution goals were at most partially achieved, a¤ecting only some
occupations and being o¤set by changes to the level of family incomes.
Keywords: Income Distribution, Policy Evaluation, Oaxaca-Blinder, Heckit.
1 Introduction
Following the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, equalizing incomes across classes became
one of the main goals pursued by Iranian governments as expressed in the framework of
three development programs implemented from 1990 through 2004. The rst development
program began in 1990 and continued untill 1994 while Mr. Rafsanjani was president.
The goals of this program were a reform in the economic structure, control of population
growth and promotion of social justice through the redistribution of wealth, decreasing
the gap between rich and poor, and balancing the wages and incomes of various economic
sectors. Deregulation was one of the main characteristics of the economic policy under the
rst half of the Rafsanjani presidency.
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yCorresponding author. Tel.: (+98 21) 22802708; Fax: (+98 21) 22802707; E-mail address:
n.khiabani@imps.ac.ir.
1
The second development program began in 1995, when the Rafsanjani government
returned to its previous price regulation policies, and continued untill 1999. This programs
rst guideline was the realization of social justice; as such it dened the Gini coe¢ cient
as the criterion for income inequality and set decreasing the value of this coe¢ cient as
the main goal of the program. In addition to these social justice goals, this program also
included plans for privatization, reform of the tax system, extension of the social security
system, and reduction of the countrys dependence on income from oil exports. This
program also proposed reforming wages and the salary payment system.
The third development program, introduced in 2000, was designed with the aim of in-
creasing privatization and minimizing government intervention in the economy. Moreover,
as in both previous programs, reducing income inequality was set as a further impor-
tant goal. This program also dened certain instruments such as the social security and
insurance systems as a means of promoting social justice.
Reviewing the goals of all these three programs indicates that improving the equity of
income distribution was constantly one of the central goals that led Iranian policy makers
in determining overall policies for the economy of Iran. This raises a question, aside from
consideration of the various aspects of pushing distributive policies, and that is to what
extent these di¤erent policies implemented from 1990 to 2004 met the goals stated above.
It should be noted that, since improving distributions solely for certain occupations is not
su¢ cient proof of a general change, we focus on the e¤ect of distributional polices at the
family level in addition to their e¤ects on all occupations; this is because, sometimes the
government distributes wages more equitably, but in transferring this e¤ect to the level
of the family, it fails, since the e¤ects of the policy on other factors o¤set the e¤ects on
wages.
In this paper, we demonstrate how policy shifts between 1991 and 2004, a¤ect income
ows in di¤erent occupations and integrate this to the family level; based on these re-
sults, we evaluate the e¤ectiveness of policy measures on income distribution during that
period. We follow an Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) microsimulation framework as extended by
Bourguignon et al. (2004); moreover, we use Heckmans correction method in successive
years to capture sample selection bias. This method helps us evaluate the e¤ects on the
distribution that policy shift has caused in comparison to the hypothetical case without
the occurrence of the policy shift.
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The microsimulation methodology used in this paper is a very simple dynamic single-
country model that may be seen as an extension of the well-known Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position. In our microsimulation, the e¤ect of the policy shift is obtained by comparing
the actual and the hypothetical distribution obtained by a simulation of the population
observed at the current period and the remuneration structure observed during the previ-
ous period. Since our objective is to compare a society a¤ected by a policy shift with a
society una¤ected by that shift, we face a sample selection bias in applying this method,
because there is no data for the various economic actors and the income level in the hy-
pothetically una¤ected year. As the characteristics of the una¤ected society, we choose to
use the remuneration structure of the year before the shift happens, and this assumption
of two successive years alleviates the problem of structural changes but cannot resolve it.
Heckmans (1976) method for capturing sample selection bias is used in this paper in
order to capture the endowment e¤ect in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. Velez, et
al. (2002) and Bravo, et al. (2000) have used Heckmans method in studies of income
distribution, but in their application for describing participation of women in the labor
force, Heckmans method does not have any signicant e¤ect on the prediction power
[p]ossibly because of the lack of proper instruments, the correction for selection proved
insignicant (Bourguignon, et al. (2004, p. 189)). We, on the other hand, use the
signicant power of Heckmans two-stage method to predict the hypothetical year that is
una¤ected by policy shifts. Our method regards previous methods as special cases and
adds an instrument for capturing sample selection bias, given that there is no data for the
hypothetical year.
The organization of this paper is as follows: in section 2, we discuss our model; the
empirical results are presented in section 3; section 4 illustrates our conclusions.
2 Model
The rst component of our model is an identity that denes income per capita in household
h with nh members and three activities:
yh =
1
nh
"
3X
j=1
Ijh:Y
j + yoh
#
(1)
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in which Y j is series of an individuals income in activity j, and the inner product Ijh:Y
j
aggregates earnings of those individuals who belong to household h; the denition of Ijh is a
dummy variable, one when corresponding element of Y j belongs to a person in household
h, and is otherwise zero. In expression 1, household income is dened as the aggregation of
earnings Y j for those individual members of household h across activities j, and of other
sources of household income yoh.
An individual i earns, in activity j, an income yji which depends on his or her socio-
economic characteristics; likewise, yoh, other sources of household income depends on house-
hold specic characteristics. We replace the density function with the linear model; the
following equations show this relation:
log(yoh) = X
o
h
o + "oh (2)
log(yji ) = X
j
i 
j + "ji j = 1; 2; 3 (3)
There are thus four equations: the last three equations (2) and (3), for individual ac-
tivities and the equation for other sources of household income; they will be integrated
into (1). Thus this model will present a complete relation between family income, charac-
teristics and the family members, such that we can use this model in a microsimulation.
However, in this model we do not control for occupational choices. In the next step, we
develop this model further in order to compare two given situations. Without loss of
generality, the rest of this section will be considering one of the mentioned four equations.
2.1 Microsimulation
The essence of notation in this section is like that of Bourguignon, et al. (2004, chapter
2, page 19), however, the di¤erence is the fact that in their notation t, and t0 specify two
time periods but we think of two situations s, and s0: an a¤ected and a hypothetically
una¤ected situation from a policy shift that occurs in time period t, a year we refer to as
"this year"1. Let f s(y), and f s
0
(y) be the density functions of the distribution of income
y, or any other denition of economic welfare, at two mentioned situations s, and s0. The
1Here, we assume that we know when the policy shifts. However, tracing this fact is case dependent;
in our application we dene a measure for the amount of policy shift in di¤erent years and match it to
economic facts. For more description please see section 3, empirical results.
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objective of the analysis is to identify the e¤ective factors in the change of the distribution
from the second to the rst distribution: a hypothetical una¤ected situation s0 to an
a¤ected situation s from the policy shift in this year.
To do so, Following Bourguignon, et al. (2004, p. 27), we depart from the joint distribu-
tions 's(y;X), where X is a vector of individual or family characteristics. The distribution
of incomes, f s(y) , is of course the marginal distribution of the joint distribution 's(y;X):
f s(y) =
Z
:::
Z
c(X)
's(y;X)dX (4)
where the integral is over the domain c(X) on which X is dened. Denoting gs(yjX), the
distribution of income conditional on X, an equivalent expression of the marginal income
distribution at situation s is:
f s(y) =
Z
:::
Z
c(x)
gs(yjX)s(X)dx (5)
where s(X) is the joint distribution of all elements of X at situation s. We can write this
distribution for situation s0 as well.
Given the elementary decomposition, it is a simple matter to express observed distri-
butional change from f s
0
(y) to f s(y) as a function of the change in the two distributions
appearing in (5) that is to say, the distribution of income conditional on characteristics
X, g(yjX), and the distribution of these characteristics, (X). To do so, Bourguignon, et
al. (2004) dene the following counterfactual experiment:
f s
0!s
g (y) =
Z
:::
Z
c(x)
gs(yjX)s0(X)dx (6)
The distribution would have been observed at situation s0 if the distribution of income
conditional on characteristics X had been that observed in situation s. Likewise, we may
dene the counterfactual
f s
0!s
 (y) =
Z
:::
Z
c(x)
gs
0
(yjX)s(X)dx (7)
where, this time, it is the joint distribution of characteristics that has been modied. Note
that this latter distribution could also have been obtained starting from the situation s
and replacing the conditional income distribution of that situation by the one observed in
situation s0. In other words, it is identically the case that, with obvious notation,
5
f s!s
0
g (y) = f
s0!s
 (y) (8)
On the basis of the denition of these counterfactuals, the e¤ect of policy shift f s(y) f s0(y)
may now be identically decomposed into
f s(y)  f s0(y) =
h
f s(y)  f s!s0g (y)
i
+
h
f s
0!s
 (y)  f s
0
(y)
i
(9)
taking means under the parametric assumption that the conditional mean of gs(yjX) may
be expressed as Xs would actually lead to the well known Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition:
ys   ys0 = Xs(s   s0) + (Xs  Xs0)s0 (10)
which is the actual equation Bourguignon et al. (2004) present on pages 21 and 29 of
their book. The observed distributional change in (9) is expressed as the sum of a price-
behavioral e¤ect and an endowment e¤ect.
Now suppose ideally that we have characteristics and incomes of individuals and fami-
lies in both situations s and s0. In a simple way of performing without considering general
functional problem, we replace the density function by following model in both situations
s and s0:
log(ysi ) = X
s
i 
s + usi (11)
log(ys
0
i ) = X
s0
i 
s0 + us
0
i (12)
in which ysi , and X
s
i are individual or family is income and characteristics in situation s,
and likewise in situation s0. Using equations (11) and (12), we may write the identity of
decomposing the e¤ect of the policy shift for individual or family i as:
\log(ysi )  \log(ys0i ) = Xsi (s   s
0
) + (Xsi  Xs
0
i )
s0 (13)
This expression decomposes the change from the policy shift for an individual or family i
into two separate coe¢ cient and endowment e¤ects. Equation (9) refers to full distribution
and equation (13) is for an assumed individual or family i.
As mentioned above, our objective is to compare a year which is a¤ected by a policy
shift with the same year which is not a¤ected by that shift. Indeed, the intention of this
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paper is using the data from "previous year", the year t 1, to nd some indicators that sig-
nal for the hypothetical una¤ected year e.g., the indicator we could use for the coe¢ cients
s
0
is that of the same model in the previous year. While we can capture the coe¢ cient
e¤ect following the procedures of Oaxaca (1973), Blinder (1973), and Bourgouignon et
al. (2004), the procedure has serious limitations in capturing the endowment e¤ect in our
objective. The reason that induces us to include the second term in equation (13) using
another convenient term to consider the endowment e¤ect is that, if a change has occurred
in the characteristics of some group in two successive years, it may arise from the fact that
people do not cease improving in certain characteristics when this is already in progress.
For instance, educational improvement in society may not be an e¤ect of policy shifts.
Overall, we want to create a density function for a notional period that has not ever really
occurred, which is why we have a sample selection bias. For this we use Heckmans model
which helps us to consider endowment e¤ects, or structural changes of a simulated year,
in addition to accessible coe¢ cient e¤ects.
In our microsimulation, we start by comparing the actual distribution in this year
and the hypothetical distribution obtained by simulating the population observed again
in this year but using the previous years coe¢ cients. Indeed, to alleviate the problem
of the endowment e¤ect, we analyzed two successive years; in addition, we use Heckman
(1979) to capture sample selection bias. Doing this, the rst "Heckit" equation for the
hypothetical una¤ected situation s0 could be the equation (11) with the data from the
previous year t  1,
log(yt 1i ) = X
t 1
i 
t 1 + ut 1i i = 1; :::; N
0 (14)
Then we need the second Heckit equation, for which we merge two databases of this
year and previous year. Here, in fact we constitute the situation s0 using the data from
the previous year because the situation s0 would have the same structure of that year in
transition to this year if the policy shift had not occurred. Our second Heckit equation is:
Dt;t 1i = X
t;t 1
i 
t;t 1 + U t;t 1i i = 1; :::; N +N
0 (15)
X t;t 1i s are the variables from our merged database, which determine the probability of
the existence of an individual or family with a specic socio-demographic characteristic
and income in previous year, and Dt;t 1i is a dummy variable, which is dened as follows:
7
Dt;t 1i = f
+1 if date of X t;t 1i is t  1; previous year
 1 if date of X t;t 1i is t; this year
(16)
Based on denitions in 15 and 16, Dt;t 1i > 0 or U
t;t 1
i >  X t;t 1i t;t 1 is for the case in
which we have our desired data and obviously is una¤ected by the policy shift because it
belongs to the previous year. On the other hand, when we have a negative Dt;t 1i is when
we would like to have some data from una¤ected situation s0 in this year but we do not.
However, for a negative Dt;t 1i we use our second Heckit equation to correct for the fact
that we do not have the desired data. Equation (14) helps us to create Mills Ratio as in
Heckman (1979):
zi =  X t;t 1i t;t 1 i = 1; :::; N +N 0 (17)
i =
(zi)
1  '(zi) =
(zi)
'( zi) i = 1; :::; N +N
0 (18)
where  and ' are, respectively, the density and distribution function for a standard normal
variable. In the next step, we separate the data for inverse of Mills ratio, i, for previous
year and add it to regressors of equation (14) to run the second stage Heckit equation for
the previous year, which can now be referred to as una¤ected situation s0:
\log(yis0) = xt 1i c
s0 + t 1i cs0 i = 1; :::; N 0 (19)
Using Mills ratio we can disentangle those e¤ects on income which come from current
characteristics from those e¤ects which come from the change in characteristics prior to
the policy shift. In fact, Mills ratio transits previous year hypothetically to a time period
between the previous year and this year under the condition that no policy shift has
occurred. Likewise, we could start from year t, in equation (14) with superscript t, and
nd the a¤ected situation s in the time period between the previous year and this year:
\log(yis) = X tic
s + ti bs i = 1; :::; N (20)
As mentioned above in (19) and (20) we think Mills ratio puts our model hypothetically
in a situation where both characteristics from previous year and this year belong to a time
period between the previous year and this year but the former is una¤ected and the
latter is a¤ected, so that we can say that endowment e¤ects are automatically controlled.
8
Consequently, we can substitute parameters of the equation in the a¤ected situation s
with that of una¤ected situation s0, and compare both a¤ected and una¤ected income
structures from the policy shift as follows:
\log(yihypothetical s0) = X tic
s0 + ti bs i = 1; :::; N (21)
ti =
\log(yis)  \log(yihypothetical s0) = X ti (c
s   c
s0) i = 1; :::; N (22)
This equation actually corresponds to equation (13) and ti is the amount of change in
individual or family is earnings as a result of the policy shift in this year.
Finally, we specify ti in deciles with respect to income to compute the e¤ect of the
policy shift on an average person or family in each decile, i.e., the e¤ect of policy shift in
year t on a middle class in decile j is:
EFFECT tj =
[0:1N ]jP
i=[0:1N ](j 1)
ti
[0:1N ] j = 1; :::; 10 (23)
in whicht is sorted with respect to earnings in year t. Analyzing these ten results requires
special rules and is also severely state dependent, depending on the state of the economy
under consideration. We nd, however, that any policy being successful in reducing income
inequality is reected in a decreasing order that is EFFECT tj is decreasing in j.
2
3 Empirical Results
The Statistical Center of Iran (SCI) has been gathering data on the socioeconomic char-
acteristics of households in Iran since 1963. This data consists of all socioeconomic char-
acteristics of a sampling of Iranian households drawn each year. We use fourteen series of
the data from 1991 to 2004 to model the four equations in (2) and (3) which constitute (1).
Given Iranian data denitions, individual incomes may come from three activities: wage
earning, business activity, and other kinds of transfer. In addition, we use households
2Ination does not a¤ect the slope of di¤erences in income with respect to deciles, because using
logarithms in addition to CPI adjustments of the previous years income to the year under consideration
changes only the levels in Figure 2.
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consumption subtracted from earnings of family members as an indicator for other sources
of householdsincome.3
In our calculations over this fourteen year period we intend to identify the occurance of
a policy shift by determining a change in the remuneration structure of society. In order to
do this, we assume that a policy shift has a direct impact on the remuneration structure.
Following this idea, we use a Wald test to compare parameters of the equations for two
successive years. In doing so, we average probabilities of equality of the corresponding
parameters of the four equations, in (2) and (3), in the two successive years t and t  1:
rrt 1;t =
1
K
 
3P
j=1
KjP
k=1
Pr(j;tk =
[j;t 1k ) +
KoP
k=1
Pr(o;tk =
\o;t 1k )
!
(24)
In this denition Kj and Ko represent the numbers of variables used in X for the
jth equation in (3) and equation (2), K =
P
jKj + Ko, and superscripts t and t   1
characterize coe¢ cients for the respective year. We call this ratio the "resemblance ratio".
Resemblance ratio is our measure of the amount of the policy shift such that the greater
this ratio is, the more similar the coe¢ cients in the two years are. We interpret this as less
policy shift occurrence. Conversely, this measure can be used to identify years in which
substantial changes in the remuneration structure occured at local minima with respect to
years.
We calculate the resemblance ratio of all 14 years as portrayed in Figure 1. Four years
show a reduction from previous and following years, since they are four local minima. This
fact indicates that the familial remuneration mechanism is more a¤ected in the years 1994,
1997, 2001, and 2003, changes which were probably related to the return to previous price
regulations in the second half of the Rafsanjani presidency, the beginning of the rst half
of the Khatami presidency, the beginning of the third development program, and a policy
break in the second half of the Khatami presidency, respectively. In the next subsection,
we have also considered the years 1995 and 1998 whose resemblance ratios are relatively
at the same levels as previous years.
The regression results for 1994, which showed the greatest policy shift, based on the
resemblance ratio, are shown in Table 1. For calculating Mills ratio, named LANDA,
the data for year 1993 are also used. We have controlled for ination by adjusting the
3Please see Appendix for a description of the data and denitions in this survey in addition to the way
we have aggregated this data.
10
Figure 1: Resemblance Ratios for 14 years
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
91.92 92.93 93.94 94.95 95.96 96.97 97.98 98.99 99.00 00.01 01.02 02.03 03.04
earnings and spending of the year 1993 to the target year 1994 by the ination rate in that
target year. This table is useful for clarifying how the regression for equations of these
four activities of a family is run. After merging the databases of two years and calculating
Mills ratio, we redo all regressions while adding Mills ratio to the regressors. Finally, we
substitute coe¢ cients and evaluate e¤ects on di¤erent income deciles as we did in (22),
and (23).
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However, further on, using (1) we will integrate all these e¤ects to nd the e¤ect at
the family level. To continue, we analyze the results in identied years of policy shift.
3.1 Analyzing policy shifts by income groups
This section is based on substituting parameters in equations as shown in equations (22),
and (23). In fact, we substitute coe¢ cients of simulated una¤ected hypothetical years for
corresponding coe¢ cients of a¤ected years and compare the income sphere with the case
without substitution. Following this we analyze these e¤ects for the case of Iran. Figure
2 shows our ndings; in each plot the horizontal axis is ten deciles and the vertical axis
is the change in logarithms of average earnings in the corresponding subgroup; indeed,
in notation of equation (23) the plot is EFFECT tj with respect to j for deciles; and
superscript t is for the fact that this is a change in the e¤ect of a policy shift a¤ecting
year t. We have three activity groups in addition to the family level for a sector analysis.
As an example, we take the gure for Entrepreneurs in year 1994; it shows that for two
average individuals in the rst and last deciles, the latter with higher income but both
working as entrepreneurs, these policy shifts a¤ecting 1994 have increased the logarithm
of the income of the high income entrepreneurs and decreased that of the low income
ones. In other words, poorer entrepreneurs have lost some opportunities that they would
have had, had this policy not been implemented, and rich ones have, in e¤ect, found new
opportunities4.
Policy shift e¤ects in 1994: All occupations face unequal e¤ects in addition to the fact
that lower deciles always lose some opportunities and higher deciles gain from policy shifts.
At the family level, there is no trend except a minor gap between the rst and the last
deciles. Moreover, lost opportunities at the family level are observed.
Policy shift e¤ects in 1995 : All entrepreneurs are caused to lose some opportunities,
and this may be a side e¤ect of the inuence of high ination, which decreased the value
of their income. However, we have taken ination into account. In contrast, wage earners
observe an increase in income and this is probably due to the fact that the government tried
4Our data about family income is based on consumption in the family, but saving in this survey is
evidently not to be trusted. So, by considering all activities, one may argue that our result has its source
in the fact that higher income groups increase consumption less when faced by higher income. Indeed this
fact does not detract from our analysis when we propose that the policy has not caused a more equitable
distribution. However, if one extends this method to other cases in further research, this should be taken
into account.
12
to compensate their losses from ination. Given the e¤ect on wage earners, entrepreneurs,
other transfer recipients and other sources of household income, the gure shows that an
average family in the rst decile lost some opportunities as a result of the policy shift.
On the other hand, an average family in the tenth decile has experienced an increase in
income which was not possible in the case of no policy shift.
Figure 2: Impact of policy shift on logarithm of earnings of occupations and families in
income deciles (comparing an a¤ected to a hypothetical una¤ected situation)
Year 1995 is characterized by government attempts to distribute incomes more
equally. These attempts made wages and some transfers more equal, but the government
was not able to a¤ect the earnings distribution of entrepreneurs and other sources of
household income.
Policy shift e¤ects in 1997: All occupations face unequal e¤ects and at family level
there is no trend except a minor gap between the rst and last deciles. Moreover, lost
opportunities at the family level are observed to stem from other sources of household
income.
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Policy shift e¤ects in 1998: Attempts to distribute incomes more equally have shown
a successful result in distributing wages, and the excess of entrepreneurs, but in other
cases unequal e¤ects are observed. In that year, e¤ective policies caused an increase in the
highest family deciles logarithm of earnings three times greater than that of the lowest
deciles earnings, namely the lowest increased by one percent, and highest increased by
three.5
Policy shifts in 2001 and 2003: Opportunities did not decrease, but policy shifts did
cause an increase in higher decilesopportunities more than that of lower deciles. For
example, entrepreneurs in all deciles are almost una¤ected, but for deciles 9 and 10 a very
large increase is observed. At the family level we observe, as in all other years, unequal
e¤ects. We can see that all deciles benetted in addition to some especially high increments
for the middle classes. Although an increase is achieved, it does not correspond with the
government objective, which was for more equitable income distribution.6
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have applied microsimulation using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
as well as a Heckman correction for sample selection bias in order to compare simulation
results for a hypothetical unchanged situation with an actual policy shift.
This model has been applied to household data from Iran, and its results show some
discontinuities in years 1994-95, 1997-98, 2001, and 2003. Based on the results of year
1995s and year 1998s changes, shifts in policies succeed in distributing wages more equi-
tably, but not in distributing more equitably over most occupations and other sources of
household income. In regard to other years, there is no evidence that policy shifts have
reduced inequality. At the family level, the results show that the after-e¤ect on incomes
of policy shifts are observed in higher deciles of income, and that lower deciles of income
su¤er from either losing expected opportunities or else they are not a¤ected as much in
comparison to higher income deciles.
A useful extension of this paper would be a comparison of results with similar studies
5Indeed, we have observed that for this case Gini coe¢ cients do not show this unequal e¤ect.
6When we depict all e¤ects for the family, it shows the same Gini coe¢ cients in the simulated hypo-
thetical year 2003 with a policy shift, and that without the policy shift. In fact, the Lorenz curves are
nearly identical. But, one may see in gure 2 that there is a big gap between the gain of the rst and the
tenth deciles.
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in other countries. In doing so, if the analysis comes out in the opposite direction and
makes use of consumption data for tracing other sources of household income (since in
our case, income data is not reliable as families are inclined not to declare the correct
amount of their income), one should consider the smaller marginal propensity to consume
for higher deciles of income.
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Appendix: Data
The Statistical Center of Iran (SCI) has been producing their Household Income and
Expenditure Survey (HIES) since 1963. This survey had been implementing some improve-
ments in denitions and samplings each year untill 1974 which makes it hard to compare
di¤erent years. However, after 1974 basic denitions are compatible. We use fourteen
series of the data from 1991 to 2004 to model the four equations in equations (2) and (3)
which constitute (1). Since the main goal of this survey is obtaining weights for the con-
sumer price index, it covers the whole country without any specic geographic area being
excluded; moreover, it covers all consumption from food and clothing to durable goods
over a 12 month period, and the whole income data starting with wages and ending with
all other transfers in the same time period.7 In table 2, sample sizes in the years under
consideration in this paper are provided.
We aggregate all activities to three main groups: wage earnings, business activity
(entrepreneurs), and other kinds of transfers such as pensions, life insurance, etc., and
these are the three activities we dened in equation 1. One big problem in this survey is
that expressed incomes are not to be trusted, while expenditures can be. We aggregate
all expenditure in the family, subtract this from the earnings of family members and add
their expressed savings, which results in the di¤erence between what the family earns and
what it spends. This di¤erence may have various sources: rst, as mentioned above, is
the fact that family members are not inclined to reveal their income. Second is the fact
that families may be self employed. We call this di¤erence "other sources of household
income", and in the notation of equation 1 it is represented by yoh.
Denitions of variables we use in our application are presented in table 3. Income and
expenditure data are aggregations of items to the three mentioned subgroups. Divisions
7Iran, Islamic Rep. of, Household Expenditure and Income Survey, 2003, GENERAL INFORMATION
AND BASIC DEFINITIONS. <http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/SSM6/E/325A.html>.
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are extensive and naming all of them is beyond the scope of this paper; more details may
be requested from the authors.
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